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Introduction
I (Micro) Search theory: Stigler (1962), McCall (1970),
Burdett Mortensen (1990), survey by Rogerson et al.
(2007): based on dispersion of wages → reservation
strategy.
I An important determinant of job acceptance is commuting
time.
I Either the job is close enough...
I Or it’s far and then decide whether to move.
I If moving is not easy: job is rejected.
I Explore a model which is the dual of conventional search
models.
I Interaction between the labor market and the housing
market.
I Strategy depends on distance.
What makes people (un)happy? 
 
Happiness Index  Average tine  (hrs) /day 
 
Sex       4.7       0.2 
Socialising after work   4.1        1.1 
Dinner      4.0       0.8 
Relaxing      3.9       2.2 
Lunch      3.9       0.6 
Exercising     3.8       0.2 
Praying       3.8       0.5 
Socialising at work   3.8       1.1 
Shopping, Cooking   3.2       3.1 
Computer at home    3.1       0.9 
Housework     3.0       1.1 
Childcare     3.0       1.1 
Evening commute    2.8       0.6 
Working      2.7       6.9 
Morning commute    2.0       0.4 
 
...Introduction: Questions
I How might the functioning of the housing market affect
unemployment/employment?
I Theory results: aggregate unemployment depends (at least
partly) on frictions in the housing market.
I More job offers are rejected;
I Quits are more frequent;
I Employers therefore post fewer vacancies;
I Combined: multiplier effect.
I Quantitative part. Housing cause of a difference between
the US and EU?
I We find that housing frictions appear to matter more for
Europe than the U.S.
I Order of magnitude: percentage point ; the bulk is still in
the labor market.
Mobility
I Mobility decisions are quite complex:
I Job related reasons;
I House related reasons;
I Family related reasons;
I Schools;
I For the U.S. and EU:
Mobility Data
US EU15
Mobility rate 15.5% 4.95%
Share within county / area 0.67 0.83
Share between county / area 0.33 0.17
I Data sources:
I US: Census 2000
I EU: European Community Household Panel (1999-2001)
I NB: area not well defined (presumably smaller than a
county).
...Mobility Data
US
All pop. (1+) intra-county inter-county all
Work related 5.6% 31.1% 16.2
Family related 25.9% 26.9% 26.3
House related 65.4% 31.9% 51.6
Others 3.0% 10.1% 6.0
All reasons 100% 100% 100
EU15
intra-area inter-area all
Job related 7.61% 40.0% 14.3%
Personal Reason 31.6% 29.8% 31.3%
House Related 59.1% 28.1% 52.7%
Not Available 1.7% 2.11% 1.8%
All reasons 100% 100% 100%
Model
I A dwelling: bundle of services generating utility X .
I Services are attached to a location, immutable.
I Many amenities associated with a location.
I Could be a unit of production of household goods.
I Could be a capital asset.
I For these services pay a rent or mortgage.
I General model, but focus on distance to jobs, ρ. Isotropy
of space. Space is symmetric: the unemployed have the
same chance of finding a job wherever their current
residence.
I Therefore, ρ is a sufficient statistic. Plan to relax this
assumption–allow for anisotropy.
Environment
I Time is continuous. Individuals discount at r > 0.
I Individuals either E or U.
I Employed
I Receive exogenous wage w .
I Face an exogenous separation rate s.
I No on-the-job search.
I Unemployed
I Receive flow b.
I Receive job offers, indexed by distance to work ρ.
I Find jobs at Poisson rate p.
Search with Frictions in the Housing Market
I Both employed and unemployed: face two types of housing
shocks (Poisson):
I Sometimes, they need to move (family or housing shock):
δ.
I Draw at any time from the existing stock of housing
vacancies
I Distributed as GS(ρ)
I At random time, they can relocate to get closer to jobs:
λH .
I Draw from a distribution of housing vacancies (may think
of those vacancies as new)
I Distributed as GN(ρ).
I Presumably more attractive than GS(ρ).
...Search with Frictions in the Housing Market
I λH is the parameter reflecting frictions in the housing
market.
I If infinity, no frictions
I If zero, no mobility.
I Idea behing λH : People may not move instantaneously to
their preferred location.
I All leases expire on June 30 in Quebec,
I Discriminating strategies by landlord (length of eviction),
minimum period for a lease.
Bellman Equations
I E (ρ): Value of employment at distance ρ from the job.
I U : Value of unemployment.
(r + s)E (ρ) = w − τρ+ sU + λH
∫
max [0, (E (ρ′)− E (ρ))] dGN(ρ′)
+δ
∫
max[U − E (ρ),E (ρ′′)− E (ρ)]dGS(ρ′′)
(r + p)U = b + p
∫ ∫
max[U ,E (ρ′),E (ρ
′′
)]dFJ(ρ
′)dGS(ρ′′),
I where τρ is the total commuting cost.
I Note: combine FJ and GS such that
∫
max[U ,E (ρ)]dF (ρ)
and 1− F = (1− FJ)(1− GS).
Reservation Strategies
I Job acceptance and moving stategies: E is downward
sloping in ρ,
∂E
∂ρ
=
−τ
r + s + λHPW + δPδ
,
I where the P ’s are conditional probabilities of moving.
I E (ρ) is monotonic, so a well-defined reservation strategy.
I For those employed, ρE (ρ) = ρ.
I Accept any housing offer that is closer.
I For those unemployed, E (ρu) = U .
I Accept any job offer closer than ρu.
...Reservation Strategies
I The model is quite parsimonious
I ρ determines: job acceptance F (ρU) ; residential mobility
rate
∫
λHGN(ρ) ; quit rate after relocation,
δ(1− GS(ρU)).
I Reservation rule ρU :
ρU =
w − b
τ
+
∫ ρU
0
λHGN(ρ) + δGS(ρ)− pF (ρ)
r + s + λHGN(ρ) + δGS(ρU)
dρ.
I Higher GN , higher GS , higher λH , higher w : higher
acceptance (can relocate later).
I Higher p, higher F , higher benefits: lower acceptance
(better to wait).
...Reservation Strategies
ρU
Offers are 
rejected
Offer are 
accepted
Possible trajectory: U -----> E -----> E’ -----> U
p                λH s
Density of job offers F
Equilibrium
I As said: higher p implies lower ρU (lower job acceptance).
Workers can wait for a closer job!
I Implies a negative link between ρU and labor market
tightness p (or θ = V
U
) (matching process behind).
I Last block: assume matching between vacancies and
unemployed.
I Assuming free entry of firms and job advertising cost c :
y − w
r + s ′
=
c
q(θ)F (ρU)
where θ = V
U
(TIGHTNESS) and q(θ) is the probability of
the firm meeting a worker.
I This generates a positive link between θ and F (ρU): higher
job acceptance by workers makes firm more willing to post
vacancies.
Equilibrium
θ
F(ρU): equilbrium job 
acceptance rate
Labor demand 
(vacancy supply)
Reservation 
strategy for ρU
λH
...Effects of Housing Frictions
I We also have:
Proposition 1: An increase in λH makes the unemployed less
choosy about jobs: ∂ρU/∂λH > 0.
I Differentiating the zero-profit condition for firms and using
Proposition 1, we have:
Proposition 2: An increase in λH increases job creation:
∂θ/∂λH > 0.
Unemployment
I Let p = p(θ) = θq(θ), the unemployment rate is:
u =
s ′
s ′ + p(θ)F (ρU)
,
where
s ′ = s + δ(1− GS(ρU)).
I Two types of separations: layoffs, s, and quits,
δ(1− GS(ρU)).
...Effects of Housing Frictions on Unemployment
Proposition 3: An increase in λH has three effects on
unemployment:
I it reduces the quit rate (only in δ shock case), ⇒ u ↓
I it raises the job acceptance rate of workers (through a
higher thresehold ρU), ⇒ u ↓.
I it raises θ (Proposition 2) and thus job creations, ⇒ u ↓.
...Unemployment and the Beveridge Curve
I Intuition of Proposition 3 in u-v space:
θ
Equilibrium θ
Beveridge curve
V
λH
u
λH
Mobility Rate
I Let Φ(ρ) be the steady-state distribution of employed
workers living at a distance lower than ρ.
I Φ is governed by the following law of motion:
(1− u)∂Φ(ρ)
∂t
= upF (ρ) + (1− u) [1− Φ(ρ)]λHGN(ρ)
+(1− u) [1− Φ(ρ)] δGS(ρ)− (1− u)Φ(ρ)s
I In steady state for all ρ < ρu:
Φ(ρ) =
F (ρ)
F (ρu)
s + λHGN(ρ) + δGS(ρ)
s + λHGN(ρ) + δGS(ρ)
≤ 1
...Mobility Rate
I A special case:
I If jobs are not destroyed: s = 0⇒ Φ(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0,
I All workers eventually find a house infinitely close to
their job.
I Other special case where λH →∞: also collapses to
Φ(ρ) = 1.
I Then
ρU =
w − b
τ
+
∫ ρU
0
dρ : indeterminacy
u − u∗
u
' 1− F (ρU) = reject. rate
where u∗ is the rate of unemployment, were housing
frictions totally removed.
Calibration
I Time period is a month. r = 4% annually.
I First: δ = 0 (no demographic shock) and GS = 0 (no stock
of vacant houses)
I This leaves us with two distributions:
I GN , new housing offers and F , job offers in terms of
distance ρ
I Assume F = GN = 1− e−αρ : exponential distribution
(α).
...Calibration
I The program finds the parameters of the model (λH , c , A)
to match:
I U.S. unemployment: 4.2% (average between 1999Q1 and
2000Q1).
I pF (ρU) = 1/2.4 monthly =⇒ unemployment duration
of 2.4 months.
I Mobility target of the employed (the only movers here):
17% annually.
I We also set p(θ) = Aθ0.5, y = 1, w = 0.8, q(θ) = Aθ−0.5.
...Calibration
I Crucial parameter: α (exponential distribution).
I Data on commute times from Census 2000
I Regression using an exponential CDF:
I α = 2.19
...Calibration
Figure: Distribution of Commute Times
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Findings: U.S.
Table: U.S. Calibration
λh = 0.0533 2 ∗ λh 3 ∗ λh 10 ∗ λh
θ 1.0000 1.1522 1.2148 1.2493
ρU 1.0278 1.4738 1.9521 5.6238
FU 0.8947 0.9603 0.9861 1.0000
rej. rate 0.1053 0.0397 0.0139 4.5E-6
unemployment 0.042 0.0367 0.0348 0.0339
mobility 0.0136 0.0215 0.0269 0.0445
...Findings
I Now, calibrate to Europe
I Mobility is 1/3 of the U.S.
I Unemployment duration 3 times longer.
I U-rate is 10%.
I We find λh = 0.0153:
I About a third of housing offers compared to the U.S.
I We find A = 0.1836
I Scale parameter of matching about 1/3 lower in Europe.
I We also find hiring costs to be about the same in Europe
I US: c/q = 3.8579/0.4657 = 8.28,
I EU: c/q = 1.4803/0.1836 = 8.06.
...Findings–Europe
Table: European Calibration
λh = 0.0153 2 ∗ λh 3 ∗ λh 10 ∗ λh
θ 1.000 1.1436 1.2647 1.6684
ρU 0.6446 0.7554 0.8678 1.7196
FU 0.7563 0.8088 0.8505 0.9769
rej. rate 0.2437 0.1912 0.1495 0.0231
unemployment 0.1000 0.0886 0.0808 0.0624
mobility 0.0042 0.0078 0.0108 0.0234
...Findings–What have we learned?
I Europe: Lower λh, so reject more job offers...
I Since it will be more difficult to move subsequently
I Reducing frictions in the housing market
I Reduces unemployment. By how much: counterfactual...
Additional Counterfactuals for Europe
Europe Benchmark λUSh A
US AUS , cUS bUS
θ 1.000 1.3153 2.4385 0.6122 1.4177
ρU 0.6446 0.9224 0.2862 0.4278 1.0535
FU 0.7563 0.8673 0.4657 0.6082 0.9005
rej. rate 0.2437 0.1327 0.5343 0.3918 0.0995
unemp. 0.1000 0.0779 0.0436 0.0651 0.0727
mobility 0.0042 0.0121 0.0030 0.0037 0.0051
Generalized calibration: U.S. with Demographic
Shock
I αFJ = αGN , αGS = 1/4 of those.
I c = 4.6303
I A = 0.4182
Table: U.S. calibration, δ > 0
λh = 0.0048 2 ∗ λh 3 ∗ λh 10 ∗ λh
θ 1.0000 1.0039 1.0057 1.0073
ρU 0.4109 0.4669 0.5244 0.9403
FU 0.9964 0.9983 0.9992 1.0000
rej. rate 0.0036 0.0017 7.6E-4 2.6E-6
unemployment 0.0420 0.0407 0.0397 0.0356
mobility 0.0018 0.0035 0.0049 0.0123
Generalized calibration: Europe with Demographic
Shock
I Set b = 0.65 (otherwise rejection rate too low)
I c = 1.574
I A = 0.1528
Table: EU calibration, δ > 0
λh = 0.0046 2 ∗ λh 3 ∗ λh 10 ∗ λh
θ 1.000 1.016 1.032 1.11
ρU 0.273 0.283 0.293 0.367
FU 0.909 0.916 0.923 0.960
rej. rate 0.091 0.084 0.077 0.040
unemployment 0.1000 0.098 0.097 0.089
mobility 6.1E-4 2.2E-3 3.3E-3 1.1E-2
Additional Counterfactuals for Europe with
positive delta
Europe Benchmark λUSh = 0.0069 A
US AUS , cUS bUS
θ 1.000 1.031 tbd tbd tbd
ρU 0.273 0.293
FU 0.909 0.923
rej. rate 0.091 0.077
unemp. 0.1000 0.0967
mobility 6.1E-4 3.3E-4
Conclusion
I Tractable model of the labor market and housing market.
I Calibration suggests substantial gains to removing housing
frictions in Europe
I Say, 1 percentage point.
I Most of unemployment still determined on the labor market.
I Model simple enough to be extended in several dimensions.
Appendix: Reasons for Moving-US
 
Appendix: Reasons for Moving-EU
A ECHP UDB description of variables 
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HA004 REASON FOR MOVE  
Question: What was the main reason for you to move? Was it … 
- job related (such as you or some other household member wanted to be nearer to work, found a job 
or started a business here, retired or stopped work for other reasons, etc) 
– housing related (i.e. found a more suitable accommodation or wanted a new place to live) 
– or just personal reasons? 
Codes Labels 
1 job-related 
2 house-related 
3 personal reasons 
-8 not applicable 
-9 missing 
 
Base: Households that moved to the current address at the earliest two years before they joined 
the survey. 
National differences and changes between waves 
 Sub-sample 
 B DK D EL E F Irl I L NL A P Fin S UK 
   Echp Soep      Echp Psell      Echp Bhps 
1994                   
1995           (1)        
1996           (1)        
1997           (1)     (1)   
1998           (1)     (1)   
1999           (1)     (1)   
2000           (1)     (1)   
2001           (1)     (1)   
 
